Language Matters: Designing State and
County Contracts for Services Under
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families
By Eileen P Sweeney, Barbara L. Bezdek, Sharon Parrott, Carol W Medaris, and Cary LaCheen

When Congress reformed welfare in 1996,
eliminating the Aid to Families with
Dependent Children program and creating the Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families (TANF) block grant, the design of
welfare programs nationwide changed
dramatically. 1 States receive federal dollars
based upon a formula that incorporates
the amount of funds they received in 1994
under Aid to Families with Dependent
Children; this primarily reflects their cash
assistance caseloads at that time. Due to
the significant declines in caseloads since
then, states have accumulated financial
resources that enable them to design their
programs differently. 2 States are using
some of these funds to provide job readiness, job search, and job placement services. Many have reinvested these savings
to address the work barriers many parents face and to give low-income working families access to strong work supports, such as child care, transportation

resources, education and training, and
3
state earned income tax credits.
In differing degrees and with varying
levels of success, states and counties are
turning to private organizations-both
nonprofit and for-profit-to provide some
of the services and supports that families
need; these include assessments of job
readiness and barriers to employment,
skills training, job placement, intensive
case management, assistance in securing
Supplemental Security Income, and help
in addressing barriers to work. In some
cases states have entered into contracts
or memoranda of understanding with
other state agencies to provide some of
these services and supports.
While the picture is mixed, often states
and counties have not used sufficient care
in precisely spelling out what they intend
to purchase and the types of outcomes
they expect. As a result, funds often are
not well utilized, and opportunities to assist

1Eileen Sweeney coordinated this article and wrote the introduction and conclusion.
2 ED LAZERE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, UNSPENT TANF FUND, AT THE END OF

FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2000 (2001), available at www.cbpp.org/1-22-OlsfpO0surplus.htm;
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ZOE NEUBERGER & ED LAZERE, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ANALYSIS OF TANF
SPENDING THROUGH THE MIDDLE OF FEDERAL FISCAL YEAR 2001 (2001), available at

www.cbpp.org/9-28-Olwel.pdf.
3 EILEEN SWEENEY ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WINDOWS OF OPPORTUNITY:
STRATEGIES TO SUPPORT LOW-INCOME FAMILIES IN THE NEXT STAGE OF WELFARE REFORM (2000),

available at www.cbpp.org/1-12-00wel.htm; ED LAZERE ET AL., CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY
PRIORITIES, STATES AND COUNTIES ARE TAKING STEPS TO HELP LOW-INCOME WORKING FAMILIES
at
MAKE ENDS MEET AND MOVE UP THE ECONOMIC LADDER (2001), available

www.cbpp.org/5-18-01 wel.pdf.
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families are squandered. In some cases,
contract provisions may actually be a disincentive to serving families who face barriers to work; in many cases, contracts do
not seem designed to encourage providers
to address fully the needs of parents who
have disabilities themselves or whose children have disabilities.
Contracts between state or county
agencies and other agencies or private
organizations are likely to become permanent features of state TANF programs.
State officials and advocates must closely scrutinize the language included in
these contracts to make sure that they are
designed to achieve the results the state
seeks. State lawmakers may want to consider legislation that spells out what must
be included in these contracts and agreements, as well as monitoring and enforcement mechanisms. Lawmakers should
also ensure that contract terms comply
with federal and state civil rights laws.
Statutory provisions that guarantee public access to both the contracting process
and the information contract work generates could dramatically improve the
effectiveness of contract provisions and,
as a result, the quality of services contractors provide.
In this article, four professionals share
their knowledge and expertise. Each has
looked at these issues from a different
perspective, with an eye toward strengthening contract provisions that can help
low-income families receive the services
they need to move toward independence
or to retain work and advance to better
paying jobs. Together the four perspectives offer an important road map of
insights and lessons learned for legal services advocates, state legislators, and state
officials as they consider the steps needed in their states and counties to secure
services for needy families.
In the first section, Barbara Bezdek,
an associate professor at the University of
Maryland School of Law, discusses her
work evaluating the requests for proposals Baltimore, Maryland, issued, the proposals vendors submitted, and the contracts into which the city and vendors
entered in order to implement TANF and
Maryland's corresponding state program.
She shares her findings regarding some
JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2002
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of the flaws in the city's process; she also
enumerates the elements that a community audit of the contracting process
should include in order to design better
requests for proposals that will lead to
stronger contracts and better services for
low-income families.
In the second section, Sharon Parrott,
a Center on Budget and Policy Priorities
senior policy analyst who recently
returned from two years as a senior policy analyst for the District of Columbia's
Department of Human Services, shares
insights gained from her experience at
that agency. She discusses what drafters of
contracts should consider in seeking to
maximize the documents' effectiveness,
as well as the importance of technical
assistance to vendors in securing better
services for low-income families.
In the third section, Carol Medaris, an
attorney at the Wisconsin Council on
Children and Families and formerly a staff
attorney at Legal Action of Wisconsin,
describes the circumstances that led the
Wisconsin legislature to strengthen statutory requirements governing contracts
with counties and private agencies administering the state's TANF program. She
suggests contract terms and incentives to
avoid, as well as contractual provisions
that may ensure better quality services for
low-income families. Advocates have
been playing a very important role in
improving these contract requirements.
In the fourth section, Cary LaCheen,
a senior attorney at the Welfare Law
Center and expert on the Americans with
Disabilities Act, addresses an often overlooked aspect of contracts for TANF services: the requirement that they be so
drafted as to facilitate compliance with
civil rights laws. She discusses the applicability of the requirements in the Americans with Disabilities Act and Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 for TANFfunded programs and contracts entered
into using TANF funds.
Staff at the Center on Budget and
Policy Priorities and the Welfare Law
Center have been assisting advocates and
others across the country on many of these
issues. Please contact either organization
for further information or help; contact
information is at the end of the article.
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I. A Citizens' Audit of TANF Work
Services Contracts in Baltimore
Much of the criticism of TANF as antipoverty policy has focused on its failure to
lead to self-sufficiency for families. 4 Many
advocates and scholars have also critiqued
welfare reform's constriction of recipients'
due process rights. This section proceeds
from a view that may appeal to a wider
coalition of state and local stakeholders:
that the millions of tax dollars spent on
welfare reform-a policy on which policymakers claim a consensus exists-must
be effective in achieving its stated goal of
helping welfare-reliant families make the

transition to work.
Baltimore offers a good illustration of
the urgency of mounting an effective welfare-to-work policy. Poverty has worsened
in the center city, where 60 percent of
Maryland's poor now live, as jobs and
economic opportunity have moved to the
suburbs. To implement TANF and Maryland's parallel state legislation, Baltimore
issued a series of requests for proposals
to provide employment-related services
to help welfare recipients meet welfare
reform's work requirements. To date the
city has let twenty-nine contracts to twenty vendors and committed itself to pay
some $64 million for the vendors' services.

Although Baltimore knew it needed to
serve 10,000 TANF families, this array of
contracts projected just 2,058 jobs and has
5
delivered fewer still.
A citizens' audit in Baltimore analyzed
the city's requests for proposals to provide employment services to TANF recipients and compared them to the actual
scope and quality of services and to program outcomes promised in the resulting
contracts. The audit revealed disturbing
failures on the part of Baltimore to deliver on the state's side of the reformed welfare contract. We can hardly avoid the
conclusion that the contracts unfairly
usurp poor parents' sixty-month lifetime
cap by directing them into activities that
do not lead to sustainable employment
and the escape from welfare poverty.
A. Requests for Proposals
Requests for proposals are the most
common method by which government6
entities purchase professional services.
Baltimore's requests for proposals to provide welfare-to-work services appeared at
first blush to contain important accountability tools; they proposed to assess direct
job placement vendors on important measures, including the hourly wage for job
placements obtained, the number of jobs

4 Barbara L. Bezdek wrote this section.
5The complete study is reported in Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare. NonAccountability and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contractsfor Welfareto-Work Services, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L.J.1559 (2001). Of the contracts let by the
Baltimore City Department of Social Services for 1998-99, seventeen were let to thirteen
vendors: one private for-profit corporation (America Works of Maryland), five nonprofit
entities (Baltimore Urban League, Goodwill of Baltimore, Maryland New Directions,
Chimes, and Park Height Community Center), three public colleges, and four city agencies. The largest contract went to the Office of Economic Development, the traditional
administrator of the Job Opportunities and Basic Skills/Job Training Partnership Act welfare-to-work component of the 1988 Family Support Act, which preceded the 1996 welfare reform legislation. Ironically, under its contract with the welfare agency, the Office
of Economic Development is producing twice as many "work experience" slots as job
placements for Baltimore's Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) population
More than twice as many people (4,855) were to receive services counting as "work
experience" as were to be placed in jobs. The seventeen contracts together proposed a
total of 2,058 jobs for Baltimore's TANF customers. An additional 1,267 were to receive
services "related to" employment, such as job search, job readiness, literacy instruction,
or community service. The entire package was to serve 8,180 TANF recipients-about
1,800 fewer than the number the city estimated would reach the twenty-four-month
mark that triggered the federal mandate to comply with TANF work requirements.
6 For a fuller discussion, see id. Requests for proposals often include a comprehensive specification of services that must be provided; this approach is not universal, h owevcr, as government agencies often encourage prospective contractors to develop their own methodology. See KEVIN LAVERY, SMART CONTRACTING FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT SERVICEs 63, 66 (1999).
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with and without benefits, and the number of persons placed in full-time unsubsidized employment or enrolled in other
work activities (by type). 7 The requests
for proposals included the customary provision that failure to deliver could result in
termination of multiyear contracts.
However, in key respects, the requests for proposals offered prospective
vendors little guidance about the city's
needs or requirements. For example, they
required scant attention to the labor market accessible to Baltimore residents. 8 A
critical failing of this form of request for
proposals is that the city waited to hear
from its bidders to learn the parameters of
its program, including such key factors as
the number of individuals to be served,
the number who would be aided by job
placements or by some intermediate spot
on the continuum from welfare to paycheck, and even the cost of the vendordependent program to taxpayers.
Baltimore's approach thus delegated
significant aspects of program design to
the vendors. One result is that vendors'
programs vary enormously in the character and quality of every aspect of the
services they offer TANF customers.
Another result is that, given the absence
of both effective program prescription
and contract management, the local government is not in the driver's seat for its
policy or service delivery. It is acting in
derogation of the responsibilities devolved to it by the state.

B.

The Contracts

Not surprisingly, the contracts let pursuant to deficient requests for proposals
magnify the deficiencies. The contracts
provide for services to too few TANF
recipients and aim for quite limited employment outcomes; the few contracts that

are expressly connected to real job openings engage in "creaming" of the recipients who are most job-ready. Most vendors that are paid for "direct job
placements" in fact do not promise job
placements for most welfare recipients.
Thus Baltimore has been expending most
of its funds for welfare-to-work services
apparently without any expectation that
most welfare recipients will thereby
achieve employment success and independence from welfare.
1. Value-Added? Low Expectations
for Employment Outcomes
The vagueness of critical terms in the
vendors' program proposals reflects the
failure of the requests for proposals to
structure tightly, and to render enforceable, the policy goal of helping parents
secure and retain employment. Ten vendor
programs variously aim for customers to

The contracts unfairly usurppoorparents'
sixty-month lifetime cap by directing
them into activities that do not lead
to sustainableemployment.
be "placed in jobs," "placed with employers," or "to be employed." Six vendors'
contracts call only for programs whose
attenuated relation to employment includes
the number to "be enrolled," to "complete
a career plan," or to "be served." The absence of definitions and governmentselected performance benchmarks renders
the count, and the contractors' obligations,
nearly meaningless. For example, one vendor projected that 600 individuals would
"receive employment" and then
forecast

7

Balt. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Request for Proposals for Direct Job Placement Program
Services, BCDSS/IMA-97/015-S para. 3.7 (1997).
8
The quality of the service specification is a critical ingredient of effective contracting.
Local government can clarify what it wants from vendors by specifying the resource
inputs needed for the task (e.g., the number and qualifications of personnel needed for
the job and the number of clients to be assisted); processes and tasks; and outputs and
performance expected to meet contract standards. LAVERY, supra note 6, at 66. The
requests for proposals asked vendors to identify the occupations TANF recipients were
"most likely" to obtain after the vendor's program and to offer some evidence that
the
Baltimore metropolitan labor market would support the services the vendor proposed.
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that 450 of these would "retain employ9
ment for at least 7 days."
Value-adding vendors-those whose
services increase the likelihood that a
TANF recipient will find and retain gainful employment-are most clearly vendors that either contract for training with
employers who will hire those who complete the training successfully, offer training that leads to a credential in an occupation likely to have recurring vacancies
in the locale, or both. Several vendors
received funding to provide job training
for specific service-sector occupations that
were widely thought to offer the greatest
employment opportunity for low-skilled,
minimally educated women. However,
these vendors made no promises that successful trainees would receive job offers.
For example, Baltimore Goodwill entered
into a contract to train seventy people for
positions as "house person, room attendant, utility steward, salad pantry."
Without making any commitment, it stated a bare expectation that the hotel site
of its training "will hire our customers if
a position is available during the initial
pilot phase of this project." 10
Three vendors claimed that they
would conduct training that would lead to
a state license or credential. A local community college said that it would offer a
selection of training programs that might
include emergency medical technician
and geriatric nursing assistant. Workers
in these fields are certified upon passing
a state-administered test. The vendor
explained that its selection of training programs "will depend on the actual employment demands in the Baltimore area," but

it did not explain how, when, or on what
11
basis it would make that decision.
Similarly Catholic Charities pledged to
help recipients conduct "meaningful
career planning and job search," including certification opportunities "in a field
that could provide employment. ' 12 The
city apparently assumed that these vague
assertions complied with the requirement
of the request for proposals that vendors
demonstrate that employment to which
their services would lead was available in
the Baltimore metropolitan labor market.
The Chimes program illustrates both
an advantage and a disadvantage of the
city's reliance on vendors to design its

employment readiness program. The disadvantage is creaming. Perhaps understandably, a vendor selects trainees whom
it believes have the greatest likelihood of

completing the program successfully. On
the other hand, Chimes offered valuable
credential and job prospects and specified an extensive list of prerequisites to
enrollment, including possession of a high

school diploma or its equivalent; at least
eighth-grade proficiency in writing and
mathematics; good health; ability to lift
fifty pounds; passing a medical examination, drug screening test, and criminal

background check; and possession of a
13

current driver's license.
Other vendors practiced creaming

that was less comprehensive but still significant. Baltimore Goodwill's hotel services program included drug and criminal

background screening "to assure that we
do not train a customer who could not
be hired" by the partner hotels. 1- Some
vendors specified literacy prerequisites,

9See Balt. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Family Investment Program Plan 42 (1999) (summarizing
Welfare to Work Academy of Morgan State University).
10
Balt. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Grant Agreement Between Baltimore City Department of
Social Services and Baltimore Goodwill Industries for Hospitality Training and Placement
Services app. A (1997). If no such position was available, the vendor planned to -ask
Omni to help us locate a similar position" elsewhere downtown.
1 Bait. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Grant Agreement Between Baltimore City Department of
Social Services and Baltimore City Community College (1997).
12
Balt. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Grant Agreement Between Baltimore City Department of
Social Services and Catholic Charities Head Start 5 (1997). The vendor suggested a ninety-hour certification in Early Childhood Education and a Health Care certificate. Id.
13 Bait. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Grant Agreement Between Baltimore City Department of
Social Services and the Chimes for Job Training and Placement Services app. A (1997).
14
Balt. Dep't of Soc. Servs., Grant Agreement Between Baltimore City Department of Social
Services and Baltimore Goodwill Industries for Hospitality Training and Placement
Services app. A at 2 (1997).
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while others offered assistance in securing a high school equivalency diploma;
America Works of Maryland required the
ability to complete its application form.
Nearly all vendors excluded "current substance abusers," and most excluded persons with a "substance abuse history."
2.

Missing in Action:
Contract Management
Despite the modest promise of the
requests for proposals, the contracts subsequently let revealed no meaningful
benchmarks or outcome measures, and
none contained any control provisions.
Only two vendors proposed that outcomes serve as a measure of performance,
and only one proposed payment only for
performance. 15 At least one recent study
found that Baltimore was not at all unusual in this approach. Formal contract management is largely absent in local government procurement, and few of those
responsible for contract oversight are procurement professionals or have any formal training in contract management.16
C. Components of a Citizens' Audit
Undertaken from a citizen-stakeholder's perspective, an audit of a governmental system of contracts for TANF
services might examine the following factors:
1. Policy Goals of the
Contracting Program
A threshold question is, of course,
whether contracting out TANF services
serves appropriate goals. If so, to what

extent are these articulated in the request
for proposals and specified in the contracts? Defining "appropriate goals" requires thoughtful input beyond that available from the agency that lets the
contracts. The low-income communities
most affected by the work activity requirement, program clients, and the larger
community to be served, as essential
stakeholders in this significant reformulation of the ways in which government
provides assistance and supports to its citizenry, all ought to have a consultative
17
role at this stage.
Goals that are in tune with community
needs will likely include "cross-program"
goals that are not specifically the subject
of the services sought by the contract in
question but involve policies of the same
governmental unit, such as a specified percentage reduction in poverty in an area, or
goals for community involvement or local
capacity building. Minnesota, for example, designed its program expressly to
increase employment and to reduce
poverty, and independent analysts con18
firm that state's significant success.
2.

Performance-Goal Setting
Contracts that emphasize high numbers of job placements can pressure vendors to focus on the easier-to-serve. If
payment is made only as numerical goals
are achieved, are smaller communitybased organizations precluded from successful competition because they are less
able to muster the cash flow necessary to
sustain a contract whose payout is tightly pegged to performance benchmarks?

15 America Works of Maryland proposed to be paid $5,490 per person still employed six
months after placement in a full-time job with benefits and $4,320 per person employed
for at least six months in a job without benefits.
16
LAVERY, supra note 6, at 71-72.
17

E.g., THERESA J. FEELEY & SHERI A. BRADY, NAT'L Ass'N OF CHILD ADVOCATES,

BEYOND

DECLINING CASELOADS: ADVOCATES' TOOLS FOR MONITORING WELFARE REFORM (1999).

Federal
and state administrative procedure acts expressly exempt requests for proposals, and so
the familiar processes of notice and comment rule making, limited as they often are in
ensuring meaningful public participation, are absent here. Thus advocates must find
other means to convey their perspectives.
18
VIRGINIA KNOX ET AL., MANPOWER DEMONSTRATION RESEARCH CORP.,

REFORMING WELFARE AND

REWARDING WORK, A SUMMARY OF THE FINAL REPORT ON THE MINNESOTA FAMILY INVESTMENT

PROGRAM 2-4 (2000), www.mdrcorg. Notably Minnesota was found to have reduced

poverty and increased employment for the group considered key by many policymakers: single-parent long-term recipients, who comprise the majority of the welfare case-

load and who are least likely to enter employment on their own. Id. at 2.
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On the other hand, citizens should be able
to learn whether established vendors are
held responsible for achieving the outcomes they promised.
Does the welfare agency set realistic
contract goals? Do numerical goals undermine softer goals, such as ensuring equity in services, avoiding racially disparate
employment patterns in placements, offering services that match clients' needs, or

Contracts that emphasize high numbers
ofjob placements can pressure vendors
tofocus on the easier-to-serve.

Assessment of the Employment
That Contractors Secure
for Clients
A valuable assessment requires
examination of both quantitative and
qualitative factors. Maryland is one of
many states that have adopted a "work
first" policy in order to move the most
job-ready welfare recipients rapidly into
work. Its caseload has dropped precipitously, though not as much as in some
other states. Maryland officials are proud
that at least half of the people who have
left welfare are employed three months
later. They say little about the other 50
percent, except to suggest that they left
cash aid voluntarily. Officials downplay
the circumstances of this group, but evidently a huge number have disappeared
without securing work.
4.

building the capacity of local contractors?19 To the extent that contracts reflect
"partnership" approaches, in which the
state offers significant technical assistance
and information during the term of the
contract to increase the likelihood of success, as distinguished from old-fashioned
compliance monitoring, does this model
produce effective services or undermine
the government's ability to enforce performance standards?
3.

Implementation of TANF
Work Requirements
Is the state doing its part by providing the services that will enable clients to
leave welfare for work? In light of time
limits, are TANF recipients receiving adequate assessments that frame their options
and lead to the support they need to
move successfully into the work force and
to stay there? Do service providers match
clients appropriately to jobs or to employment-related services? Are employmentrelated services in place? How well do
they serve job seekers and employers? Are
local agencies able to align their expec-

19

tations that clients will move toward work
with the actual availability of services that
will enable clients to overcome barriers
to employment? One prong of a useful
audit could be scrutiny of the use of "personal responsibility contracts." Advocates
in Baltimore discovered in 1998 that TANF
recipients were required to sign blank
personal responsibility contracts, despite
the requirement of state law that the plans
specify both the work activities required
of the recipient and the supportive ser20
vices to be provided by the agency.

5.

Contract Management,
Renewal, and Rebid Decisions

We must know who reviews performance and evaluative data, according to
what standards, and how reporting
requirements are implemented. Some situations may appropriately call for less
stringent review. For example, agencies
may decide to apply to contracts granted
to pilot projects or to smaller community-

The evaluation criteria for the U.S. Department of Labor's Welfare-to-Work bonus program, authorized by the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-33, 111 Stat. 251,
include (1) entry into unsubsidized employment, (2) six-month retention in unsubsidized employment, (3) six months of earnings in unsubsidized employment, and (4)

20

attainment of educational or occupational credential by participants who entered unsubsidized employment.
See FAMILY INV. PROGRAM LEGAL CLINIC, TIME OUT!: A STATUS REPORT ON WELFARE REFORM IN
BALTIMORE CITY AT THE THREE

AND THEIR LEGAL ADVOCATES
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EXPERIENCED BY THOSE IT WAS INTENDED TO HELP

10 (1999), www.law.umaryland.edu/faculty/czapanskiy. asp.
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based organizations, where capacity
building is a goal, renewal terms that are
more forgiving than those applied to larger contracts. Consider local experience
21
with this approach.
In this era of heightened reliance on
contracting out to provide services, what
roles do agency staff retain for achieving
the new welfare objectives within the
framework that the private vendor contracts create? In particular, what training do
they receive in managing these contracts?
The underlying policy of the 1996
welfare law requires that jobs to which
the new services lead be assessed for their
ability to promote clients' self-sufficiency
through work. Self-sufficiency is a concept amenable to serious debate, but, in
the work-force development field, job
access, retention, earnings, and benefits
are common measures of progress toward
self-sufficiency. In Maryland, as in much
of the nation, data on welfare leavers who
are working suggest that many still live
below the poverty level and that their jobs
22
are likely contingent and lack benefits.
6.

Evaluation of Contract
Performance

Government review of service vendors' performance also requires close
scrutiny. How is the private contractor
held accountable for compliance, performance, and outcomes? To what extent is
the local agency serving the citizens by
contracting carefully, measuring vendors'
21

performance properly, and making renewal and rebid decisions in line with
suitable measures? Performance measures
and incentives, including pay-for-performance, are potentially important tools in
23
the privatization kit.
D. What Should Government Do?
In implementing welfare reform, government at every level should seek to
increase employment and decrease poverty, while it seeks to reduce dependence
on welfare. To that end, government
agencies must design contracts with workservice vendors to secure employment in
a value-added sense: employment that
leads to existing jobs that TANF recipients retain for significant periods and that
pay wages above the poverty level.
Advocates in Baltimore have been
pressing the Department of Human
Resources to improve the operation of the
contracted work-service vendors by remedying deficiencies in how customers are
assigned to specific vendors and in the
assessments of job readiness and barriers
to employment on which the assignments
are intended by statute to be based.
Advocates argue that Maryland should
"refund" at least the first three years of
TANF recipients' five-year lifetime limit to
the thousands who complied with work
activities under Baltimore's "family investment" program, while the welfare agency
failed to conceptualize or implement its
side of the bargain adequately.

A useful primer is JESSICA YATES, MANAGING THE CONTRACTING PROCESS FOR RESULTS IN WELFARE

REFORM, WELFARE INFORMATION NETWORK (1997), www.welfareinfo.org/contractissue.htm.
See, e.g., CATHY BORN, UNIV. OF MD. SCH. OF SOC. WORK, LIFE AFTER WELFARE: AN INTERIM

22

REPORT 26 (1997) (58 percent of leavers earned wages reported in state administrative
systems, and average earnings for 1996 were $4,818; half earned less than $3,041); id.,
LIFE AFTER WELFARE: THIRD INTERIM REPORT 41-45 (1999 (reporting the top twenty employment categories of Maryland's welfare leavers and questioning whether these jobs will
pay enough to enable them to support their families and avoid a return to the welfare
rolls); SHARON PARROTr, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, WELFARE RECIPIENTS WHO FIND
JOBS:

WHAT Do WE KNOW ABOUT THEIR EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS? (1998),
www.cbpp.org/11-16-98wel.htm.
23 Responsible benchmarks and contract management practices do exist as models for state
and local TANF job services. Congress relied upon performance-based management
principles in aspects of the TANF statute; it reinforced the work participation requirements with a system to award bonuses to "high-performing States," defined as those
most successful in achieving the purposes of the TANF program. The Department of
Labor's Welfare-to-Work bonus program and the Workforce Investment Act are two
major initiatives designed to include meaningful benchmarks and outcome evaluation,
thereby suggesting a serious concern for their effectiveness as work-force development
programs. See Bezdek, supra note 5, at 1588-91.
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II. Considerations in Designing
Contracts That Work:
District of Columbia
A new request for proposals for a second
round of TANF employment service contracts from the District of Columbia's
Department of Human Services would
select vendors to help TANF recipients
prepare for, find, and retain jobs. 24 The
first set of these contracts had been
awarded in 1998, and both the agency
and the vendors agreed that the contract
structure had to be changed substantially. Policymakers had decided that the new
contracts should be "performance-based"
(the first round contracts were also performance-based) and that the primary outcome measure should be achievement of
unsubsidized employment.
Each vendor selected would serve a
random group of TANF recipients. Many
of the district's TANF recipients had substantial barriers to employment. A significant number were long-term recipients
of cash assistance. Roughly two-thirds of
all recipients, in the agency's estimate,
read below the sixth-grade level. Thus the
contract structure and payment mechanisms had to take into account the difficulty of the contractors' task of helping
low-skilled and barrier-challenged recipients find and retain employment.
Several welfare-to-work experts, as
well as state and local agencies around
the country, confirmed that no generally
accepted standards or identified best practices governed the design of such contracts. Little systematic research was available on the best way to structure the
contracts, the best "payment points," or
the appropriate levels of payment. In fact

other states and cities were also struggling
either to develop similar contract language
or to determine whether their current contracts were yielding the desired results
and whether different contract terms

A. Contract Goals
Without much of a guidebook, we
began to develop new contract terms. The
following were some of the key goals we
identified for the new contracts:
1. Increase Incentives for Vendors
to Serve Clients Unlikely to
Find Employment Immediately
We wanted the terms of the contract
to discourage "creaming" of the caseload
and to provide explicit incentives for vendors to seek out clients who did not
respond to initial letters informing them of
the requirement to participate in work
activities. Like many jurisdictions, we had
found in the first round of vendor contracts that many recipients did not "get in
the front door" of programs-they did not
respond to letters telling them of their
program assignment, and vendors did not
do enough to seek out these recipients
and encourage participation.
2.

Ensure That Payments Are
Adequate to Sustain Vendors
Who Perform Adequately

Setting performance-based payment
levels is difficult. On the one hand, the
contracting agency wants to reward good
performance. On the other hand, the reality of welfare-to-work programs is that
some recipients will not find or retain
unsubsidized employment, and many will
be unable to do so in the short term. Thus,
within a performance-based structure, payments must be large enough to allow vendors who perform adequately to operate
their programs, that is, the payments wvhen
a recipient succeeds must be large enough
to offset reasonable costs of services to
those who do not find jobs quickly (or at
all). Payments under the district's first contract were inadequate, and even high-performing vendors lost money and found it
difficult to maintain their programs.

would affect the results.

24 Sharon Parrott, who wrote this section, worked at the District of Columbia's Department

of Human Services for two years beginning in the spring of 1999 as a senior policy analyst in the areas of TANF, food stamps, and Medicaid. One of her first tasks was to design
a new request for proposals for a second round of TANF employment service contracts.
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3.

Emphasize Unsubsidized
Employment While Recognizing
"Intermediate Successes"
District policymakers were clear that
the goal of the work program was to help
recipients find unsubsidized employment,
not to engage in long-term education and
training efforts. This emphasis was due, in
part, to concerns about meeting the work
participation rates. Policymakers also were
concerned, however, that tying too large
a portion of potential payments to vendors to job placement and retention
would give vendors strong incentives to
"cream" the caseload. Thus we also identified as a goal offering financial payments
for recipients' "intermediate successes,"
such as completing orientation and being
assessed by the vendor, with payments
made weekly if recipients were participating in activities.
4.

Improve Vendors' Capacity to
Provide Quality Services

The agency was very concerned that,
even with an improved contract structure,
some of the entities likely to apply for a
contract lacked extensive experience or
expertise in operating programs to help
welfare recipients find jobs. The agency
recognized the difficult task we were asking outside entities to perform and wanted to find ways to help the vendors
improve their performance and upgrade
their own skills.
How we structured the contract terms
to try to meet these goals is the subject of
the rest of section II.
B. Crafting Contract Terms to Meet
the Agency's Goals
After looking at TANF employment
service contracts from several jurisdictions,
we developed a set of payment points as
well as a new mechanism for referring
recipients to service providers. Taken
together, these were the means by which
we hoped to achieve the contract goals.

25

Changing the Referral Structure
While defining the payment points
and levels is a key component of designing a performance-based contract, developers of TANF employment services contracts often seem to overlook the referral
mechanism. As noted above, one of our
key concerns was that, in the district and
throughout the country, many recipients
assigned to a work program never attended or participated. To address this problem, the new contract radically changed
the mechanism for referring TANF recipients to employment service vendors.
In the first round, each contract stated the total number of recipients a vendor could serve over the course of the
year. This, coupled with a payment structure that rewarded quick job placement
and little else, meant that each vendor
had a strong incentive to request large
numbers of referrals in a single batch,
send letters to those recipients asking
them to attend the vendor's program, and
then serve only those customers who
"showed up." To address this problem,
we developed a referral concept we called
the "point-in-time" caseload.
Under the new structure, each vendor's contract specified the number of
recipients it was able to serve (its "pointin-time" caseload), and at any given time
the vendor could not have a higher number of TANF recipients assigned to its program. When the contract began, TANF
recipients were assigned to vendors in
numbers equal to the vendors' contractual point-in-time caseloads. 25 A recipient
remained a part of that vendor's point-intime caseload until the recipient retained
a job for three months, was found to meet
an exemption criterion (such as having a
child under a year old), or had failed to
participate and had been sanctioned for
three months. A vendor could not recommend imposition of a sanction without showing that it had taken certain steps
to encourage the recipient to participate.
1.

This is a simplification since some of the vendors had been providing services under the
first round of TANF employment service contracts. These vendors kept their currently
active cases and were assigned new cases in numbers that brought their total caseload
up to their point-in-time caseload.
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This structure precluded vendors from
requesting referrals of more recipients than
they could serve and then ignoring those
who failed to respond to modest recruitment efforts. Instead recipients not found
exempt would remain part of the vendor's
point-in-time caseload for at least four
months (a vendor could not likely recommend a sanction that could be imposed
on a recipient in less than one month). In
response, many vendors began to conduct
home visits for recipients who failed to
participate and to offer creative incentives
for attendance at orientation sessions, such
as serving meals or offering vouchers to
popular stores where they could purchase
items for their children.
This point-in-time caseload concept
was a subject of contract negotiations. If
a vendor bid for a large point-in-time
caseload but submitted staffing plans that
seemed inadequate to serve a caseload
of that size, the vendor risked not being
awarded a contract or being asked to
revise its point-in-time caseload request
or its staffing plan or both.
The point-in-time caseload concept
was an important improvement in the
contract, but implementing the new
approach successfully took some time.
Despite an explanation in the request for
proposals and a requirement that potential vendors explicitly state their requested point-in-time caseload size, many vendors were initially confused by the
concept. This was particularly true for
many of the community-based vendors
that had little experience providing services under a performance-based contract.
As discussed below, the contract's
payment points also were designed to
provide a clear signal and strong financial incentives for vendors to adopt measures that would increase participation
rates among recipients referred to them.
These included rewarding vendors when
recipients "came in the front door" and
when they were participating in activities,
rather than issuing a payment only when
a recipient found a job.
2.

Payment Points

The district decided to set the payment points and levels in the request for
proposals rather than having vendors

propose how much they should earn
when they achieved certain goals. (Other
jurisdictions often allow vendors to bid
on payment levels, an approach that
results in either paying different amounts
to different vendors or using the bids to
develop a uniform set of payment levels
for all vendors that receive contracts.) The
district set the payment rates due largely
to its concern that, because a significant
portion of the provider community was
not used to performance-based contract
models, many local vendors would be ill
equipped to make informed bids. The
request for proposals set payment points
as shown on table 1.
These payment points, taken together, were designed to meet the goals we
had identified: to encourage vendors to
take steps to increase recipients' participation rates, to ensure that the payments
were adequate so that reasonably performing providers did not lose money,
and to maintain a strong focus on job
placement while rewarding vendors for
helping recipients meet "intermediate"
goals. When developing a performancebased contract, we must recognize that,
while vendors receive payment only
when they reach certain benchmarks, the
payments-including resources devoted
to recipients who do not ultimately "succeed" by finding a job-must be sufficient
to enable competent vendors to support
their entire operations. Thus the question
is not "how much should it cost to help
a recipient find a job?" but rather "how
much should a vendor be paid for each
recipient who finds a job?"
Insufficient payments can lead vendors on a downward spiral. Facing financial pressure, they may cut staff; this leads
to programs of poorer quality and even
lower earnings. Thus, while performancebased contracts can give vendors strong
incentives to improve performance, payments must be adequate. Agencies should
be willing to reevaluate payment levels if
vendors with good perfonmnance are struggling financially.
While assessing the adequacy of
these payment points is difficult, district
vendors seemed to be in far better financial health under this structure than under
the previous one. There contract vendors
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Table 1.-Payment Points in a Performance-Based Contract
Payment Point

Maximum Amount

Initial payment

$400

Weekly fee

$50/week

Placement bonus

$1,500

Retention bonus

$1,200

Higher-wage bonus

$300

Adult education bonus

$200

could rarely earn even $1,500 for each
recipient who found and retained a job.
After the new set of contracts had been in
place for almost a year and contract
renewals were being considered, the payments potentially available to vendors
were increased again. Modifications included a $400 payment for initial job
placement (even if the job did not last
four weeks), up to $1,200 if a recipient
retained a job for six months, $200 for a
home visit that resulted in program participation by a recipient who had not previously participated, and a $500 adult education bonus. The contracts have also
been modified to include bonuses to
recipientswho find and retain jobs.
C. Contracts Based Purely
on Performance?
The district considered only a purely
performance-based contract structure,
under which all of a vendor's earnings
depended on recipients achieving certain
goals. While jurisdictions have a strong
JANUARY-FEBRUARY

2002

1

Description
Earned per recipient who
attended orientation and
completed an assessment
Earned per recipient participating in activities

Earned per recipient who
retained a job for at least 4
weeks
Earned per recipient who
retained a job for 12 weeks
Additional bonus if a recipient for whom a retention
bonus was paid earned at
least $7.50/hour
Earned per recipient who
participated in adult basic
education

Goal
Encourage vendor to
adopt measures to
encourage participation
Reward the "intermediate
success" of active participation in work-related
activities and encourage
vendors to invest time and
effort in recipients who
were less job-ready
Focus on helping recipients find unsubsidized
employment
Focus on job placement
and retention
Reward vendors who help
recipients find higher-paying jobs (and encourage
emphasis on job quality)
Encourage vendors to
allow and promote adult
basic education, particularly programs funded in a
separate agency initiative

interest in basing payment on performance, too little is known about the benefits of contracts that are based partially
on reimbursement of costs and partially
on performance, compared with those
that are purely one or the other.
A hybrid approach that combines cost
reimbursement and performance-based
components would have the advantage
of guaranteeing vendors a base level of
funding. Though less than operating costs,
such a base level of funding would reduce
the financial risk contractors assume
should performance-based payments be
lower than expected. Payments could be
low for a variety of reasons, including
poor quality of services, imperfect calibration of payment points and levels, a
caseload with more barriers to employment than previously recognized, or a
weakening job market (a growing concern now that the economy is in a recession). If a contract tied a large portion of
a contractor's earnings to performance but
also included a cost reimbursement com-
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ponent, the vendor would retain a strong
incentive to provide quality services and
would face reduced financial risk.
Jurisdictions interested in contracting
with community-based vendors must consider the level of fiscal risk implicit in various contract designs. Community-based
vendors may be far less equipped than
larger corporate entities to accept high
levels of fiscal risks.
D. Investing in Efforts to
Improve Vendor Performance
In addition to changing the referral
mechanism and payment terms, the new
District of Columbia contract made one
other substantial change. It committed to
contract with a technical assistance
provider that would work with all of the
district's vendors to help them improve
their programs. The employment service
vendors were contractually obligated to
work with the technical assistance provider. The district made this decision
because it recognized that even a welldesigned contract structure would not
change the underlying capacity of the
entities that were likely to submit bids.
Based on the agency's experience in the
first round of contracts, we were concemed that many of the potential vendors
would lack the organizational capacity to
learn about and replicate emerging best
practices from around the country or to
engage in aggressive staff training. In
short, the payment structure alone would
not foster the kind of improvement in
contractor performance we needed.
Thus the district contracted with a
technical assistance provider-in this case,
Mathematica Policy Research Inc.-to
work with all its vendors of TANF services to help them identify weaknesses
in their programs and develop solutions.
We found that both community-based and
large corporate vendors needed and could
benefit from technical assistance.
Mathematica worked one-on-one with
vendors and arranged for many hands-on
training sessions with their staffs to offer
lessons from programs around the country. Some sessions were geared toward
program managers and focused on pro-

gram structure; these addressed issues
such as the components of a comprehensive job search program. Other sessions were for vendors' caseworkers and
focused on how to help recipients prepare themselves for life changes and on
strategies for engaging reluctant participants. While leaving much room for
improvement, investing in technical assistance for the vendors appeared to improve the quality of services provided to
recipients.
Some might argue that the district
paid to train private entities so that they
could earn more money from the district
government. Without the technical assistance, however, the recipients would have
been required to participate in lower-quality programs and would have been the
real losers.
Government has increasingly looked
to private entities to provide services that
government believed it either was not
equipped to provide or had provided
poorly in the past. Government must recognize, however, that simply contracting
out these services does not make the
underlying task easier. Regardless of who
undertakes the job, helping recipients find
employment is difficult when they face a
variety of barriers. Entering into a partnership with vendors to help them
improve their services is a worthwhile
investment.
III. Designing Contracts for
TANF Services-the
Wisconsin Experience
Wisconsin's TANF program, "Wisconsin
Works" or W-2, authorizes the state to contract with either governmental or private
agencies. 26 For the first contract period,
from September 1, 1997, through
December 31, 1999, most of the state's seventy-two counties administered their own
programs, as did three tribes. Five counties
operated as a consortium. However,
Milwaukee County, which has the largest
number of recipients, contracted with five
private agencies, and thus these entities
served most recipients in the state. Each
of the five agencies, which include two
that are for-profit, operated in a distinct

26 Carol W. Medaris wrote this section.
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district. Five other private agencies oper- instituted stricter sanctions. Even the
ated in eight other counties, with one Department of Workforce Development
responsible for four counties. Subsequent had not expected such "success"-it had
contract periods have seen a slight decline based initial contract allocations on an
in administration by county agencies and estimated caseload at start-up of about
where 49,000 families.
tribes and an increase in counties
27
The contract terms for the first period
private agencies administer W-2.
of
two
years and four months provided for
Department
the
authorizes
State law
based entirely on the amount of
profits
conaward
to
Development
of Workforce
each W-2 agency saved out of its
money
process
tracts based on a competitive
Advocates pointed out at
allocation.
initial
of
approved by the state Department
that
this
offered an overwhelming
the
time
pericontract
the
first
For
Administration.
reduce
caseloads still more.
incentive
to
or
od, county departments of human
provided that W-2
The
contracts
social services and tribes had the right of
initially
draw down, under
could
agencies
first refusal to administer the program in
75 percent of
formula,
a
fairly
complicated
critheir jurisdictions if they met certain
28
after
unspent
them
but
reduction.
due
the
money
caseload
teria, primarily
29
and
that
formula,
year.
Under
the
first
By August 1997, the month before Wa
as
well
as
reduction
the
caseload
given
2 began, caseloads in Wisconsin were
benin
which
of
cases
number
significant
down to about 35,000 families, from about
65,000 in January, 1996. This reduction efits were reduced due to sanctions, agenwas a result of both the strong incentive cies realized very substantial profits.
In early October 1998 the Milwaukee
posed by the right-of-first-refusal caseload
Journal
Sentinel reported that from a total
reduction criterion and the implementaof $265 million, $107 million,
allocation
tion of two other programs that served as
of the amount budgeted
or
40
percent
a phase-in to W-2: Self-Sufficiency First,
ten
months of the program,
for
the
first
which required applicants to search for
was
"surplus"
work and consider any alternatives to
cash assistance, and Pay for Performance,
because far fewer people than
which increased the number of particiexpected are using the programs,
pants who were required to work and
records show.
27 For

the second contract period, January 1, 2000, to December 31, 2001, in addition to
county agencies there were two tribal administrators and ten private agencies-one
operating in five counties, one in two counties, three in one county each, and the same
five continuing to operate in Milwaukee County. Beginning in January 2002, in addition
to county agencies, one tribe and nine private agencies will operate programs-one in
six counties, one in four counties, three in one county each, and four in Milwaukee
County. Two for-profit agencies will continue to operate in Milwaukee County. (Five
tribes developed a TANF plan and are working directly with the federal government.)
28 Initially the goal was a 25 percent reduction in the twelve months before August 30,
1996, when selections were to be made. However, counties and tribes received an adjustment based upon reductions occurring before the twelve-month period. Monthly reports
of each agency's progress were sent to all agencies. After nine months, all but Milwaukee
County and three tribes had met their goals, in many cases several times over. See, e.g.,
Wis. Dep't of Health & Soc. Servs., Div. of Econ. Support Administrator's Memo 95-56
(Dec. 27, 1995); id., Bureau of Welfare Initiatives Operations Memos 96-14 (Feb. 9, 1996),
96-25 (Mar. 11, 1996), 96-38 (Apr. 1, 1996), 96-46 (May 1, 1996), 96-85 (June 17, 1996),
96-66 (July 2, 1996), 96-72 (July 23, 1996), 96-79 (Sept. 11, 1996). Milwaukee County
eventually agreed to relinquish its efforts to administer its own program.
29 The formula set forth a two-tier distribution mechanism for excess agency funds. Under
the first tier, agencies retain an amount equal to 7 percent of the contract amount as
unrestricted profit. Under the second tier, agencies keep the first 10 percent of the
remaining funds for unrestricted use, with the rest split equally between the agency and
the state. The agencies' portion must be reinvested in the community under terms
approved by the state. See Memorandum from Bob Lang, director, Legislative Fiscal
Bureau, on Unexpended Funding Under the Agency Contracts for the Wisconsin Works

(W-2) Program and from the Child Care Program (Nov. 3, 1998).
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These huge budget surpluses
could translate into millions of
dollars in profits for counties
throughout the state and for the
five W-2 agencies in Milwaukee
County.
Other records obtained by
the JournalSentinel offer the first
public scrutiny, since W-2 was
fully implemented in March, of a
massive number of sanctions, or
pay reductions for W-2 cash assistance participants who skipped
30
work.
The statistics for the whole first year
compiled, the W-2 surplus was $131 million out of a total contract amount of $321
million (still approximately 40 percent),
leading to $98.5 million that was available to draw down and $25 million in
pure profits for the agencies.
Based on data through August 31,
1998, the maximum amount of unexpended funding that might be disbursed
in 1998-99 was $98.5 million. Of this
amount, (1) up to $25 million in unrestricted funds might be retained by W-2
agencies statewide (the 7 percent first-tier
amount and 10 percent of the remainder);
(2) up to $36.7 million might be distributed to the agencies for community reinvestment statewide; and (3) up to $36.7
31
million might be retained by the state.
The Department of Workforce Development tried to frame the surplus as
30

proof of the program's success. However,
advocates and legislators, especially Milwaukee's Gwendolyn Moore, a state senator and former welfare recipient, raised
questions about the fate of those who left
the program and the propriety of using
state funds intended for the poor for private agencies' profits and tax relief in
32
other counties instead.
Eventually even strong supporters of
W-2 were persuaded of the need for contract changes. Rep. John Gard, considered
one of the authors of W-2 and subsequently cochairman of the powerful legislative Joint Committee on Finance,
issued a strong letter urging that performance measures be included in the second contract:
We are writing to encourage the
Department to base any profit
calculation under the new W-2
agency contracts on measures of
agency performance. These
should include criteria such as
placements of W-2 applicants or
participants in unsubsidized jobs,
whether the jobs are full-time or
part-time, job retention by former
applicants or participants (and
whether they return to the program), wages and benefits earned
by former applicants or participants, appropriate implementation of all components of the program and customer satisfaction.

Margo Huston, W-2's First Year Is Under Budget by $178 Million,

MILWAUKEE

J.

SENTINEL

(state ed.), Oct. 4, 1998, at Al.
31 Lang, supra note 29.
32 Huston, supra note 30. In the article Jean Rogers, administrator of the state's Division of
Economic Support, called the surplus evidence that W-2 "has been wonderfully successful." Others characterized the surpluses and sanctions as warning signs that the W-2 program "must do more to help the state's neediest families surmount barriers to self-sufficiency," including addictions, mental illness, or a lack of education, training, child care,
or transportation. The Sentinel also noted that Rogers had chastised Milwaukee County's
five W-2 agencies for failure to sanction participants enough in the first months of the
program and that sanctions had increased 400 percent in the seven months since then.
See also, e.g., these articles by Margo Huston, Wbat to Do with the $186 Million W-2
Surphs, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (state ed.), Oct. 8, 1998, at B3; Private W-2 Agencies to
Share in Profits, id., Oct. 13, 1998, at Al; Return of W-2 Surplus to Taxpayers Urged, id.,
Oct. 16, 1998, at Al; CountiesMay Get $40 Million W-2 Windfall, id., Nov. 2, 1998, at
Al; W-2 Agencies Urged to Take Money Coming, id., Nov. 13, 1998; State's Private
Agencies First in U.S. to Receive Profits, id., Nov. 18, 1998, at Al. See also Associated
Press, Private Groups Profitfrom W-2, Wis. STATE J., Nov. 19, 1998, for press coverage of
the discussions the surplus engendered. As the discussion progressed, some legislators
and county administrators suggested that counties appropriately might use their profits
for tax relief.
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The new contracts should not
permit agencies to receive profits
based on caseload decreases or
reduced agency spending that are
not directly attributable to placement of W-2 applicants or participants in unsubsidized employment.33
Representative Gard also admitted in
the letter that the former contract, which
allowed agencies to retain a portion of
the profits without regard to their performance, "may provide an incentive for the
agencies to focus more on reducing caseloads than on truly assisting families to
become self-sufficient."
A number of public meetings followed, organized by advocates and Senator
Moore primarily to consider how to spend
the reinvestment money but also to hear
suggestions about the new contracts. (The
Department of Workforce Development
had been asked to hold public hearings
on the contracts, but it never did so.)
On March 9, 1999, Senator Judy
Robson, chairwoman of the Senate Committee on Human Services and Aging, held
a hearing to discuss contract issues. During
the hearing, at Senator Robson's request,
the Department of Workforce Development agreed to make sure that the contract
process was open to the public. However,
on April 7, when it issued a 100-page draft
contract that included extensive performance standards, the department announced that any public comments had
to be submitted within ten days. After a
reaction of outrage by advocates and sympathetic legislators, and a contentious second hearing before the Senate committee,
the department ultimately extended the
deadline to the end of April.
On May 19, 1999, the Department of
Workforce Development issued the final
contract. 34 Performance standards included
achievement of specific rates for
a participants entering full- or part-time
employment that lasted at least thirty
days;

m wage rates at job entry, based upon
rates attained by agencies in 1998, with
bonuses for increased rates;
0 job retention rates, measured after 30
days and again after 180 days;
m "full and appropriate engagement,"
measured by whether participants had
employability plans and were engaged in
appropriate activities for at least thirty
hours per week (this also included a Food
Stamp Employment and Training program
rate of at least twenty-seven hours per
week);
m adults who were without a high
school diploma or its equivalent and were
assigned to "basic educational activities,"
including high school and equivalency
courses, job skills training, English as a
Second Language, literacy, and other basic
education; and
* availability of employer-provided
health insurance within 180 days of the
date participants entered employment.
The contract set a base rate and two
bonus-rate levels for each standard. Only
agencies meeting all the base rates were
eligible for the bonus funding. Meeting

Advocates and legislators raisedquestions about
the propriety of using statefunds intendedfor the
poorfor private agencies'profitsand county tax
reliefinstead.
base rates also entitled the agency to a
right of first selection for the next twoyear contract period, 2002 through 2003.
For those meeting the first higher bonus
level, 4 percent of the contract amount
was available for restricted use (programs
that met TANF requirements and were
approved by the Department of Workforce
Development). For those meeting the second bonus level, 3 percent of the contract
amount was available as unrestricted

33 Letter from Rep. John Gard and Sen. Tim Weeden, cochairs of Joint Committee on
Finance, to Secretary of Department of Workforce Development (Dec. 2, 1998).
34
Wis. Dep't of Workforce Dev., Request for Proposal to Administer Wisconsin Works (W2) and Related Programs (May 1999) (with cover memorandum signed by J. Jean Rogers,
administrator, Division of Economic Support (May 19, 1999)).
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funds. (For each standard agencies met at
the higher level, they received one-sixth of
the award.) Two additional standards
might substitute for one of the 3 percent
performance bonuses: (1) entry into a
valid contract with a faith-based provider
or (2) completion by 50 percent of participants assigned to basic skills or job
skills training. Advocates succeeded in
diluting the faith-based standard somewhat compared to its original form. Moreover, concerned that agencies might turn
needy families away, advocates succeeded in removing a standard that would have
rewarded low recidivism rates.
By this time, the Department of
Workforce Development seemed to have
engendered a certain amount of distrust
among some legislators. Perhaps for this
reason, the legislature enacted standards
for "performance bonuses" on its own as
part of the 1999-2001 budget. 35 In addition to most of the performance measures
included in the department's scheme, the
legislature required measurement of
whether placements were part-time or
full-time and of W-2 "customer satisfaction." Also, the state would recover any

money W-2 agencies did not spend
because of sanctions. 36 The legislature
prohibited bonuses for caseload decreases or reduced spending that "are not
directly attributable to placement or par37
ticipation in unsubsidized employment.
Whether and to what extent these
performance standards have helped make
the system work better for poor families
is difficult to know. Caseload reductions
had already begun to slow down in 1999
under the old contract. For 2000, the first
year of the new contract, caseloads were
fairly stable. Since December 2000, caseloads have been increasing again. 38 But,
of course, this increase coincides with an
economic downturn in Wisconsin as well
as the rest of the nation.
A new secretary of the Department
of Workforce Development, Jennifer
Reinert, has been much more willing than
her predecessor to listen to the community. 39 The "light touch," which instructed agencies to provide "only as much service as an eligible person asks for or
needs," is no longer in effect, according
to department spokespersons, although
it is still on the books. 40 And a recent

35 1999 Wisconsin Laws Act 9 § 49.143(3g). Advocates suggested many of the additions
and changes; ultimately the changes were primarily the result of agreements reached by
Representative Gard and Sen. Gwendolyn Moore of the Joint Committee on Finance.
36
Id. § 49.143(2)(ct).
37
Id. § 49.143(3g)(b). The governor vetoed the provision that would have given counties 3
percent of the performance bonuses for reinvestment purposes (instead of the 4 percent
going to W-2 agencies for this purpose), the provision that would have required that the
department develop a system to track former participants and applicants, and the provision that would have established a statewide advisory group, regional forums, and special work groups to address concerns about the program and provide for public input.
Id. § 1224d, 1224p (1999).
38 From January to December 1998 the W-2 cash-assistance caseload dropped from 14,391
to 9,078. In 1999 the caseload declined to 6,763, and in 2000 it ranged from a high of
6,772 to a low of 6,496. In 2001 the caseload had risen from 6,679 in January to 8,381 by
October. To get an accurate picture of the total TANF caseload, one should add the childonly cases--those in which no parent receives TANF benefits either because the parent
instead receives Supplemental Security Income benefits or because the child is cared for
by a relative other than a parent. (Although in some other states child-only cases are primarily those in which the parents are undocumented immigrants and only their children
are eligible, Wisconsin does not provide any benefits to these families.) Since W-2 began,
Wisconsin's child-only cases have ranged between about 10,800 and 11,700 per month
and have been about equally divided between those in which the parent receives
Supplemental Security Income and those in which the caretaker is a nonparent.
39 Among other innovations, Secretary Jennifer Reinert initiated a Milwaukee W-2 Advisory
Panel that includes community and advocate representation; the panel has met frequently with department representatives and has made many suggestions for program
improvement, several of which the department has agreed to implement.
40
Wis. DEP'T OF WORKFORCE DEv., WISCONSIN WORKS MANUAL § 1.1.0 (Philosophy and Goals,
No. 7). Under this provision, many applicants have been turned away without receiving
information about programs and services that might help them.
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audit found that people were returning
to the program; as of July 2000, 26 percent
of those who left in the first quarter of
1998 were receiving benefits again, and 42
percent had returned in Milwaukee
County. 4 1 The audit found that the percentage of cases in which sanctions were
imposed decreased from 31.4 percent in
October 1999 to 21.1 percent in December 2000. Sanction percentages in
Milwaukee County, however, were generally high (and error-prone)--four of the
five agencies sanctioned more than 20
percent of participants receiving cash
assistance from October 1999 through
December 2000, and one agency sanctioned an average of 48 percent of its
caseload. The dollar amounts of the sanctions also were high in Milwaukee
County, with averages ranging from 45
percent to 59 percent of benefits among
the five private agencies there.
Final contracts have now been developed for 2002 and 2003, following a period for public comment. 42 Performance
standards are similar to those described
above, with a number of new requirements, including increased assessments
for participants, a requirement that a certain percentage of participants complete

their educational programs (an option in
the previous contract), a wage gain standard rather than the previous contract's
placement wage rate standard, and a minimum score on a customer satisfaction
43
survey that the department developed.
The contract specifically requires agencies to meet the department's audit
requirements and states that they must
not have been subject to a corrective
action for substantial noncompliance with
the program. These latter requirements
are a result of extremely negative finan44
cial audits of two Milwaukee agencies.

IV. The Americans with Disabilities
Act and Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act
Many individuals receiving TANF benefits have health problems and disabilities. 4 5 The Americans with Disabilities Act
and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
are important sources of legal protection
for clients in TANF programs. Both laws
are incorporated into the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, and both apply to programs and activities receiving federal
TANF funds. 46 Both restrict the content
of contracts between TANF agencies and

41

Wis. LEGISLATIVE AUDIT BUREAU, AN EVALUATION: WISCONSIN WORKS (W-2) PROGRAM (Apr.
2001), www.legis.state.wi.us/lab/Reports/01-7tear.htm.
42
See Wis. Dep't of Workforce Dev. Adm'r Memorandum 01-07, Instructions for ReContracting for Right of First Selection Agencies for the Next W-2 Contract (Apr. 23,
2001).
43
The Milwaukee County W-2 agencies strongly opposed the latter standard.
Memorandum from Milwaukee W-2 Agencies to Jennifer Noyes, administrator,
Department of Workforce Solutions (Mar. 8, 2001) (Wisconsin Works (W-2) Contracts for
the Period January 1, 2002, through December 31, 2003: An Opportunity for Public
Comment).
44 See letter and attachment on the Maximus Inc. agency from the Wisconsin Legislative
Audit Bureau to the cochairs of the Joint Legislative Audit Committee (July 28, 2000) and
letter and attachments focusing on Employment Solutions Inc. from the bureau to the
cochairs (Feb. 16, 2001). When questioned about how these two agencies could still
have earned the right of first selection for the subsequent contract period, the
Department of Workforce Development responded that nothing in their 2000-2001 contract prevented them from earning that position. Employment Solutions eventually left
the program.
45
Cary LaCheen wrote this section. For a survey of studies of the prevalence of disabilities
among current and former welfare recipients, see EILEEN SWEENEY, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, RECENT STUDIES INDICATE THAT MANY PARENTS WHO ARE CURRENT OR
FORMER WELFARE RECIPIENTS HAVE DISABILITIES OR OTHER MEDICAL CONDITIONS (2000),

www.cbpp.org/2-29-00wel.htm.
4642 U.S.C.A. § 608(d) (2001). The other statutes incorporated into the Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act are the Age Discrimination Act,
id. §§ 6101 et seq., and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, id. §§ 2000d et seq.
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private and government organizations
47
providing services to TANF clients.
The Americans with Disabilities Act
applies to all state and local programs,
including TANF programs, and to privately operated organizations that provide education and training, screening
and assessment, mental health services,
drug and alcohol screening and treatment, and other services to TANF
clients. 48 Section 504 applies to programs
and services that receive federal financial
assistance, such as federal TANF, Welfareto-Work, and Workforce Investment Act
funds. 49 Both laws define discrimination
broadly to include failure to provide an
equal opportunity to participate in and
benefit from programs and services and
failure to make reasonable modifications
in policies and practices when necessary
to avoid discrimination unless such modifications would fundamentally alter the
nature of the program or be an undue
burden. 50 Many prohibitions of the Act
and Section 504 apply to services provided directly and those provided
through "contractual, licensing or other
arrangements. "51
A. Application of the Americans with

Disabilities Act and Section 504 to
TANF-Funded Contracts
The Americans with Disabilities Act
prohibits TANF programs and private programs serving TANF clients from using
"criteria and methods of administration"
that have a discriminatory effect or that
substantially defeat or impair the accomplishment of the objectives of the public
entity's program for individuals with disabilities. 52 Advocates can use this provi-

sion to challenge provisions in contracts
between TANF agencies and other public and private agencies. The provision is
also a strong basis for helping states think
through the types of language needed in
their requests for proposals and contracts
before they are signed.
Many perfonnance-based contract provisions, as well as contract payment
schemes, are likely to have a discriminatory
effect on people who have disabilities and
need, or are more likely to need, a greater
level of services than others. Contract provisions may violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act or Section 504 because they
do not pay for, or create incentives to provide, the services that people with disabilities need in order to have an equal
opportunity to participate in or benefit
53
from TANF programs or services.
If a contract between a TANF agency
and a private organization offering disability screening and assessment to TANF
recipients provides for a flat fee for every
individual with a completed assessment,
regardless of the number of examinations
or tests required, the contract may violate
the Americans with Disabilities Act and
Section 504 by creating a disincentive for
the private organization to administer all
of the tests and examinations that a specific individual with a disability may need.
Advocates also can argue that the Act and
Section 504 affirmatively require TANF
agencies to include performance-based
measures in their contracts and to ensure
that people with disabilities receive an
equal opportunity to obtain and continue
receiving TANF benefits, participate in
education and training programs, and
obtain TANF work exemptions.

Id. §§ 12101 et seq. (Americans with Disabilities Act); 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (section 504).
4842 U.S.C.A. §§ 12131 etseq. (2001) (Title II); Id. §§ 12181 etseq. (Title III).
49 29 U.S.C.A. § 794 (2001).
50 28 C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii), 35.130(b)(7).
5142 U.S.C.A. §§ 12182(b)(1)(A)(ii), (b)(1)(C), (b)(1)(D), (b)(2)(ii) (2001) (Title iii); 28
C.F.R. §§ 35.130(b)(1), (b)(3) (2001) (Title II); 45 C.F.R. §§ 84.4(b)(i)-(vi) (2001) (Section
504).
52 42 U.S.C.A. § 12182(b)(D) (2001); 28 C.F.R. §35.130(b)(3)(i) (2001).
53
Alternatively advocates can argue that contract provisions with a discriminatory effect
violate the Americans with Disabilities Act because they deny individuals with disabilities an equal opportunity to participate and benefit from the TANF agency's programs or
do not comply with the Act's reasonable modification requirement. See 28 C.F.R.
§§ 35.130(b)(1)(ii), 35.130(b)(7) (2001).
47
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Policy Guidance issued by the Office
for Civil Rights of the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services on the application of the Americans with Disabilities
Act and Section 504 to the administration
of TANF programs makes clear that both
laws apply to the payment structure of
TANF contracts. The guidance encourages
TANF agencies to "reimbursefl providers
in such a way as to facilitate, rather than
impede, equal opportunity for individuals
with disabilities to benefit from a TANF
program." 54 It goes on to state that when
TANF programs use outcome-based reimbursement methods, "the TANF agency
should take into account the additional
costs of providing services to persons with
disabilities so that service providers do
not reject such persons, or provide them
with inappropriate or inadequate services
55
to persons with disabilities."
Some TANF agencies have established relationships with other government agencies to provide disability screening and assessment, drug and alcohol
screening and treatment, mental health
treatment, education and training, and
other services for TANF clients. The
Americans with Disabilities Act and
Section 504 also require TANF agencies
to develop arrangements that encourage
services to TANF clients. Referring clients
to another public agency for services without providing the funds necessary to provide the services is a discriminatory
method of program administration under
the Act and Section 504. Memoranda of
54

understanding between TANF agencies
and other government agencies must
ensure that funds follow clients.
B. Case Law
No cases, as yet, appear to interpret
the interplay of TANF, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, and state contract reimbursement schemes. 56 However, in the
health care context, advocates have used
the Act to challenge the discriminatory
effect of capitation rates and other reimbursement schemes in managed care programs. In one case, managed care organization members with disabilities challenged
the financial arrangements between managed care organizations and physicians;
plaintiffs alleged that the arrangements created an incentive to delay or deny care to
people with disabilities. 57 The case was
settled on a confidential basis after denial
of defendants' motion to dismiss or for
summary judgment. 58 In Tennessee, on
the theory that the reimbursement rate created a disincentive to serve clients with
greater needs, plaintiffs sued a private
home care agency for refusing to serve
such clients. 59 The court, holding that
Section 504 reached discrimination between those with more and less severe disabilities, issued a preliminary injunction
and later denied defendants' motion to dismiss. 6° The U.S. Department of Health and
Human Services recommended to Congress that Medicaid managed care programs make higher payments for individuals with disabilities and greater health care

U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE FOR CIVIL RIGHTS, PROHIBITION AGAINST

TANF (TEMPORARY
ASSISTANCE FOR NEEDY FAMILIES) (2001), available at www.hhs.gov/ocr/prohibition.html.
For a more general discussion of the guidance, see EILEEN P. SWEENEY, CTR. ON BUDGET &
POLICY PRIORITIES, HHS GUIDANCE EXPLAINS How FEDERAL LAWS BARRING DISCRIMINATION
AGAINST PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES APPLY TO STATE AND COUNTY TANF PROGRAMS (2001),
www.cbpp.org/2-26-Olwel.htm.
55
U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., supra note 54.
56 For a more detailed discussion of the application of Title II of the Americans with
DISCRIMINATION ON THE BASIS OF DISABILITY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF

Disabilities Act to various aspects of TANF programs, see Cary LaCheen, Using Title II of
the Americans with DisabilitiesAct on Behalf of Clients in TANF Programs, 7 GEO. J. ON
POVERTY L. & POL'Y 1 (Winter 2001), availableat www.welfarelaw.org/ada-.manual/contents.htm.
57 Zamora-Quezada v. HealthTexas Med. Group of San Antonio, 34 F. Supp. 2d 433, 438

(W.D. Tex. 1998).
Settlement in Texas Shows How ADA Can Be Used to Challenge HMO Care, DISABILITY
COMPLIANCE BULL., Dec. 14, 2000, at 5.
59
See Winkler v. Interim Servs. Inc., 36 F. Supp. 2d 1026 (M.D. Tenn. 1999).
6
°d.at 1030.
58
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needs or use other program design features to prevent providers from practicing
adverse selection of people with greater
6
service needs. 1
C. Enforcing the Americans with
Disabilities Act and Section 504
Those protected under Tide II of the
Americans with Disabilities Act can enforce
the Act by filing a complaint with the
Department of Health and Human Services
within 180 days of the discriminatory con6
duct or by filing a lawsuit in court. 2
Plaintiffs may bring a private action for discrimination in programs and services
against public entities without exhausting
administrative remedies. 63 A complaint
filed with the Department of Health and
Human Services will not bar a lawsuit even
if the complaint is unresolved, but a court
has discretion to stay the caseending the
administrative determination.

61 DONNA E. SHALALA,

U.S.

FOR INDIVIDUALS WITH

DEP'T OF HEALTH

SPECIAL HEALTH

The Eleventh Amendment prohibits
private lawsuits against states for money
damages under Title I of the Americans
with Disabilities Act. 6 5 Some courts have
extended this holding to Title II damage
claims. 66 The Supreme Court stated that
government officials might still be sued
under the Act for injunctive relief under
Ex parte Young, and many courts so

held. 67 A few courts, however, held that
even claims for injunctive relief might not
be brought against states or state officials
under the Act. 6 8 Municipalities also may
be sued under the Act for all types of
relief if they are not an "arm of the
state." 69 Those that are an "arm of the
state" may be sued for injunctive relief
except in jurisdictions that limit injunctive
relief claims under the Act. Advocates also
may sue states for all forms of relief under
Section 504, which many courts held was
enacted under Congress' authority under

& HuMAN

SERVS., REPORT TO CONGRESS: SAFEGUARDS

CARE NEEDS ENROLLED IN MEDICAID

MANAGED CARE

119-20 (2000), http://hcfa.hhs.gov/medicaid/omchmpg.htm.
62 42 U.S.C.A. § 12188(a)(1) (2001); 28 C.F.R. § 35.170(b) (2001).
63 See, e.g., Schonfeld v. City of Carlsbad, 978 F. Supp. 1329, 1334 (S.D. Cal. 1997), affd
mem., 172 F.3d 876 (9th Cir. 1999); Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 857 F. Supp. 800, 818
n.12 (D. Kan. 1994).
64 Cf.Cannon v. Univ. of Chi., 441 U.S. 677 (1979) (administrative complaint under Title IX
of the Civil Rights Act does not bar a lawsuit).
65
Bd. of Trustees of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (Clearinghouse No.
52,744).
66
Thompson v. Colorado, 258 F.3d 1241 (10th Cir. 2001) (Clearinghouse No. 54,038);
Kvorjak v. Maine, 259 F.3d 48 (1st Cir. 2001) (Clearinghouse No. 53,972); Frederick L. v.
Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 157 F. Supp. 2d 509 (E.D. Pa. 2001).
67 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); Garrett, 121 S.Ct. at 968 n.9; see also Randolph v.
Rogers, 253 F.3d 342 (8th Cir. 2001), reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 16637 (July 20,
2001) (Clearinghouse No. 53,868); John Roe No. 2 v. Ogden, 253 F.3d 1225 (10th Cir.
2001); Hostin v. Ariz. Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 11401 (9th Cir.
May 30, 2001) (unpublished), reh'g denied, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 15796 (July 10, 2001);
Project Life Inc. v. Glendening, 139 F. Supp. 2d 703 (D. Md. 2001); Frederick L., 157 F.
Supp. 2d 509; State Police for Automatic Ret. Ass'n v. Difava, 138 F. Supp. 2d 142 (D.
Mass. 2001). See also Herbert Semmel, Enforcing Federal Rights Against States, 35
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 309 (Sept.-Oct. 2001). For further information on these issues, contact the National Senior Citizens Law Center, which has established a National Technical
Assistance Center on enforcing federal rights against state officials, wwwaX.nsclc.org or
hsemmel@nsclc.org.
6
8 Walker v. Snyder, 213 F.3d 344 (7th Cir.), amended by 2001 U.S. App. Lexis 16037 (July
12, 2000), cert. denied, 121 S.Ct. 1188 (2001) (Clearinghouse No. 53,130) (Congress did
not have the authority to enact Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and state
officials may not be sued under Title II for injunctive relief); Doe v. Div. of Youth &
Family Servs., 148 F. Supp. 2d 462 (D.N.J. June 25, 2001) (Congress did not have the
authority to enact Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act); Frederick L., 157 F.
Supp. 2d 509 (state may not be sued under Title II for injunctive relief).
69 Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 756 (1999).
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the Spending Clause. 70 Many courts hold
that states waive Eleventh Amendment
immunity under Section 504 when they
71
accept federal funds.
V. Condusion
The four preceding sections confirm that
securing strong, workable contracts with
provisions that will ensure that vendors
meet the varying needs of low-income
families is not an easy task. But the authors
also make clear that the task can-and
must-be accomplished. Under current
law in some states, obtaining information
about the requests for proposals and their
contents, or about the terms or results of
contracts, is often difficult for the public. As
the discussion of the Baltimore experience
and its strong community audit show, this
is an area where state legislators and advocates should consider implementing
changes to ensure greater transparency in
the contracting process and restore greater
public scrutiny over the use of these very
important public funds.
State officials-in both the legislative
and executive branches-and advocates
should carefully scrutinize the terns to be
included in the requests for proposals,
contracts, or agreements that their states
and counties are negotiating to provide
services intended to help low-income
families move from welfare to work. In
some cases, such as Wisconsin, state legislative intervention may be needed. In
others, such as the District of Columbia,

administrative action to design better contracts and provide technical assistance to
ensure that vendors are able to comply
with program rules and goals can help
make a difference. Requiring evidence of
customer satisfaction, as is now under
way in Wisconsin, has the potential to
move less responsive contractors to
devote greater consideration to the needs
of those they are intended to serve. The
work is repetitive, cumulative, and evolving-with each set of requests for proposals and contracts, improvements can
be sought and secured, as reflected in

both the Wisconsin and District of
Columbia examples.
In all circumstances, ensuring that
states and counties design their contracts to
comply with the requirements of the
Americans with Disabilities Act and Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act-as well as
other civil rights laws-is essential to protecting the rights of people with disabilities
in the TANF program. These laws give
advocates, legislators, and other state policymakers strong legal handles in a program where legal handles are few. The
Americans with Disabilities Act and Section
504 also provide a policy framework for
moving program design--including design,
implementation, and monitoring of
requests for proposals and contracts-in
directions that can be very helpful in meeting the needs of parents with disabilities as
well as all low-income families.
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